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This article provides an account of unconsidered activity drawing principally on
the ideas of John Dewey and Richard Sennett. This is done so as to better
understand the complexity, worth and limitations of craft expertise in teaching
and how it might be improved to better serve all. Four features are proposed:
much activity is unconsidered; activity is embodied; activity is purposive; and
people adapt their actions in pursuit of goals. An implication of this account is
the need for teachers to consider how resultant structured behaviours can bestow
advantages on some of their students and not others, and suggestions are made
about how this might be done.
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to explore unconsidered participation in teaching,
although the perspectives offered could also apply to other complex social activi-
ties such as nursing, policing and social work. Much has been written about con-
sidered and deliberate action in these areas. Donald Schön’s views about the
nature of professional practice remain highly inﬂuential, whilst more recent per-
spectives including those of socio-cultural theorist Stephen Billett cast new light
on this relation. However the descriptions they provide are unclear, particularly in
their consideration of routine behaviours, and all are largely silent about how
unequal relations of social power affect practice. In this paper article I brieﬂy dis-
cuss these limitations before elaborating their accounts, principally using John
Dewey’s writings on experience and Richard Sennett’s writings on craft expertise.
This elaboration shows how teacher behaviours can become patterned in ways
which advantage or disadvantage their students, and I highlight important implica-
tions of this for practice. Throughout I use the term social activity to mean activ-
ity shaped by social considerations.
Neither Schön’s account of reﬂection on and in practice (1983, 1987) nor Bil-
lett’s account of knowing-in-practice (2001) consider in any detail tacit behaviours
which are embodied, unarticulated (and to some extent unarticulatable), and of
which we may be largely unaware. This is a signiﬁcant omission if we accept
Dewey’s (1922) contention that much of our behaviour is such. In this paper article
I seek to rectify this omission by looking for a social answer to the questions:
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 How do such tacit behaviours develop and become patterned (or, in the term
more often used by social theorists, structured)?
 How can practitioners best interrogate and modify such patterned behaviours so
as to act agentively in the service of all in their communities?
Whilst these have to some extent been addressed at a macro-sociological level (for
example, Bourdieu [1993]), I consider here the micro level before linking the micro
to the macro.
The Schönian consensus
Donald Schön (1983, 1987) provides a social description of what he calls profes-
sional and what I call complex social practice, that is practice directed towards
the achievement of complex (alongside routine) social objectives. This account is
well known, and I will only provide a brief outline of it here. He considers the
knowledge which practitioners draw on to largely comprise knowledge-in-practice
encompassing what Sternberg and Horvath (1999) call tacit knowledge: knowl-
edge which is grounded in complex social activity and cannot be fully expressed.
Such knowledge can only be created by practitioners in the context of their prac-
tice. But whilst knowledge-in-practice may not be fully expressible, for Schön it
is the focus of professionals’ awareness and consideration. Thus, Schön proposes
a process of reﬂection-in-practice by which practitioners engage in a continuing
dialogue with the permanently changing situation of their practice (sometimes
called ‘thinking on their feet’). In reﬂection-in-practice and subsequent reﬂection-
on-practice practitioners make sense of their activity, and in so doing draw on
both their knowledge-in-practice and their knowledge-of-practice, the latter
including their own and others’ reﬂections on and enquiries into practice. But this
process is neither linear nor static.
Thus, for Schön, professional practice results from an iterative and dynamic
engagement between knowledge-in-practice and knowledge-of-practice through the
process of reﬂection. Knowledge-of-practice could include reﬂections on previous
experiences and their ideas about the nature of their professional work, research
including their own practitioner research, guidance and advice, and even the oral
craft-lore of the profession. But complex social objectives may be constantly chang-
ing, being deﬁned and redeﬁned by the practitioner’s ongoing conversation with
their practice. Thus, practitioners have an active and productive relationship with
their knowledge base. They construct their own knowledge base, in their own par-
ticular circumstances, with a view to addressing the particular problems which they
have identiﬁed, speciﬁc to particular groups or individuals and the context of their
practice.
For example, a teacher working with a group of students having difﬁculty
understanding how to do a mathematical calculation may draw on her or his
knowledge-in-practice (memories of what previous relevant experiences actually
felt like and expectations about the effects of particular actions) and knowledge-
of-practice (explicit ideas about approaches to teaching such calculations, the
common misconceptions students have and ways of overcoming them) in an
ongoing reﬂective personal ‘conversation’ in which the teacher measures the
effects of her or his actions against the student response and adjusts these actions
accordingly. This experience may be drawn on subsequently in similar encounters,
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be it either in hunches and remembered but unarticulated actions and effects (that
is, knowledge-in-practice) or in newly formulated ideas and opinions resulting
from reﬂective processes (that is, new knowledge-of-practice).
Schön’s account is inherently dualistic. By describing the interaction of oppo-
sites – knowledge-of and knowledge-in, reﬂection-on and reﬂection-in, and, funda-
mental to these, thinking or reﬂection and doing or practice – it runs against
holistic notions of embodied practice (which I will discuss later). This dualism has
consequences. As Eraut (1994, p. 145) suggests, ‘when time is extremely short,
decisions have to be rapid and the scope for reﬂection is extremely limited’ (1994,
p. 145). Certainly, constant considered engagement with professional practice would
make considerable demands on the time and energy of practitioners; it feels implau-
sible that practitioners have time to make considered but split-second decisions in
the heat of the action.
Schön also ‘neglects the situatedness of practitioner experience’ (Usher, Bryant,
& Johnston et al., 1997, p. 168). His account is of the individual practitioner con-
versing with practice, and despite his focus on the social nature of professional
practice, Schön’s concern is with knowledge as a possession of individual practitio-
ners (Kelly, 2006). As such, it has been criticised by some as having a weak focus
on power and politics (Ramage & Shipp, 2009). Apart from the last, these are con-
cerns which socio-cultural theorists have sought to address.
The socio-cultural challenge
There is not the space here for a full review of the socio-cultural ﬁeld. Rather, I
will focus only on the work of Stephen Billett (2001), whose views build on those
of Schön. Like other socio-cultural theorists, he argues for a view of both coming
to know and knowing-in-practice as processes which, rather than lying entirely with
the individual, are distributed across all participants (for example, teachers and stu-
dents within a classroom) and which relate to both the conceptual and the physical
resources available.
As an example we can consider again the knowledge for teaching a particular
mathematical idea. This emerges from negotiations between teachers and students
in relation to:
 the explicit conceptual resources teachers bring, their knowledge-of-practice
which might, in this case, include their knowledge of mathematics, their
knowledge of pedagogical approaches and their knowledge of common mis-
conceptions students have when learning mathematics;
 the tacit understandings gained from previous teaching and related experience,
their knowledge-in-practice which might include adopting an authoritative
posture in front of a misbehaving child, talking in a sympathetic manner to
motivate and support a child having difﬁculty or, using variety of clues, get-
ting a feel for when a child needs help or encouragement;
 the resources provided by the classroom, including whether it lends itself to
individual or collaborative group work, and whether students have access to a
range of mathematical resources including computers and calculators; and
 the conceptual resources and tacit understandings which their students bring,
including, for example, their prior learning, their beliefs about mathematics
and their disposition to particular learning approaches.
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The iteration between each of these results in knowledgeable activity on the part of
participants in the lesson, teachers and students, which Billett (2001) calls knowing-
in-practice, and which is very much socially shared and distributed across partici-
pants and resources. Here knowing-in-practice is a dynamic process resulting from
the collective actions of teachers and students together in the context of their own
work. It is speciﬁc, indeed unique, to particular instances of social practice. Teach-
ers’ knowledge-of-practice can contribute to negotiations between students and
teachers, but other factors are equally signiﬁcant – not least being the ways in
which teachers’ engagement in the working practices of schools affects their think-
ing about their practice. We can call this the affordances of school practices. Affor-
dances are participants’ (often shared) expectations of the kind of things which can
be said, thought or done during their engagement in particular social practices.
These expectations privilege particular ways of knowing and acting.
Knowing-in-practice is also a constructive process from which those involved
remember their experience of participation. Indeed, it is the history of such
remembered experiences which forms the basis of participants’ subjective knowl-
edge-in-practice, and which can be reﬂected upon and reiﬁed to contribute to their
knowledge-of-practice. Thus, from the mathematics lesson the teacher will remember
the experience from his or her perspective, and the students will do the same from
theirs. But this process is not explored clearly in socio-cultural accounts; although
these ideas provide the basis for a view of complex social practice as the outcome of
a dynamic relationship between practitioners’ and their clients’ conceptual resources,
the physical resources available, and the affordances and constraints of their
workplace, the relation of deliberation and awareness to embodied activity in socio-
cultural accounts would beneﬁt further elaboration and exempliﬁcation, particularly
in relation to descriptions of how routine behaviours and unconsidered activity in
complex social practice becomes patterned. I provide this elaboration below.
Indeed, as Sawyer (2009) suggests:
Socio-culturalists do not have an adequate theory of social structure and how it con-
strains and enables individuals. Because most socio-culturalists are psychologists or
anthropologists, it’s not surprising that they neglect macro social concerns in favor of
a focus on individual action and small group behavior. Socio-culturalists have rarely
drawn substantively on sociology, political science, or history–disciplines that argue
for the irreducibility of macro level entities or structures. (Sawyer, 2002, p. 303)
Neither, for that matter, does Dewey or Sennett, to each of whom I now turn,
but I will address this later.
The contribution of Dewey and Sennett
Socio-cultural perspectives, many of which are rooted in the ideas of Dewey
amongst others, concentrate on explaining considered and deliberate social engage-
ment and interaction. But what of far more common forms of social activity that
are unconsidered and routine. This ubiquitous phenomenon is, in my view, worthy
of attention. Revisiting Dewey’s (1896, 1897, 1922, 1925, 1927; Dewey & Tufts,
1936) ideas on experience, and referencing these to Sennett’s (2009) view of craft
expertise (he actually uses the gendered term craftsman, but with qualiﬁcation), I
propose four features to help better understand such activity which I will consider
in turn:
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 much activity is unconsidered;
 activity is embodied;
 activity is purposive; and
 and people adapt their actions in pursuit of goals.
Much activity is unconsidered
Although there is much in complex social practice of which the social actor is fully
aware and can therefore reﬂect on, not all aspects are so. Whilst some actions
within any given activity may be considered and deliberate, others involve only a
partial awareness and most occupy very little attention.
Dewey (1922) uses the term habit to refer to complex, unconsidered behaviours
comprising many smaller acts. Walking is a habit which involves many small and
coordinated muscular movements. Brought together, the culmination of much
adjustment and practice, these acts become skilled behaviours which normally
require little explicit consideration. People have many such habits – acquired predis-
positions – which can include, for example, a tendency to react to a particular social
situation in a particular way or a disposition to tackle a particular problem using a
particular approach. But Dewey asserts habits are neither ﬁxed and repetitive nor
automatic. They evolve and change in constant adaptation to their environment
(Dewey, 1922), and can be inﬂuenced and adjusted through deliberate (and some-
times moral) choice and action (Dewey, 1925; Dewey & Tufts, 1936). Deﬁning skill
as ‘trained practice’ (2009, p. 37), Sennett (2009, p. 37) sees these processes as
central in the development of craft expertise.
Take, say, a student teacher who may bring a number of strategies for maintain-
ing order the ﬁrst time they manage a lesson. Some will work and some may need
adjusting or replacing, and early experiences may be frustrating, even haphazard.
But as the student becomes more expert, maintaining order requires less awareness
and is more habitual – allowing greater consideration and reﬂection on children’s
wider learning (Bromﬁeld, 2006). If a persistently disruptive child is encountered,
speciﬁc strategies may again become the focus of the student teacher’s attention.
Sometimes teacherly behaviours may be displayed habitually in inappropriate cir-
cumstances – such as when encountering boisterous youngsters on holiday. And the
self-consciousness engendered by being observed by a tutor may actually impede
the ﬂuency of teaching. In all of this the distinction between aware and unaware is
ﬂuid as the things attended to come in and out of focus, and with this sometimes
the distinction between an internal commentary on and deliberate command of
embodied actions may not be clear.
Although much activity is unconsidered, this is not to say it is purposeless; its
purpose is simply unexpressed, set in the activity, and therefore taken for granted.
We might habitually follow routines which were purposeful when learnt. But with-
out awareness, these cannot be re-evaluated as circumstances change; so, for the
student teacher above, some management techniques may be effective in maintain-
ing order but detrimental to children’s learning.
Much of the discussion above is unremarkable but, as I have begun to indicate,
has implications when applied to complex social activities like teaching, which I
will return to later. This account differs little from early behaviourist explanations
of behaviour; the differences become clearer as it is elaborated using Dewey’s
account of experience.
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Activity is embodied
Activity is embodied: it involves the situated actions of our whole bodies; it is what
we do and feel and not just what we think. We remember much of our experiences
of participation in embodied form. This means the experiences of participation are
remembered in our muscles, senses and actions, again without necessarily recourse
to thinking. As Stafford (2009, p. 16) says, ‘We are more than the memories we
can effortfully bring to mind’.
Dewey (1922) identiﬁes two aspects to experience: that associated with reﬂec-
tive thought and knowing which has been the focus of Schönian and socio-cultural
analysis; and that which is embodied, direct and immediate, here and now. The ﬁrst
allows us to use language to objectify and assign meaning to situations and thus act
deliberately (Dewey, 1925). The latter comprises the aforementioned habits, mini-
mally regulated and reﬂected upon, which privilege particular implicit ways of act-
ing; indeed, Dewey asserts that habits taken together constitute the self, distributed
across features of the environment and so situated in it.
Consider swimming or riding a bicycle as physical examples. These are learnt
by the whole body in the whole situation, and each part of the body learns how to
act effectively and comfortably. Constant feedback in terms of successfully keeping
aﬂoat, remaining balanced and/or moving forward allows adjustment in actions and
thus improved performance, but these adjustments may well be subconscious, made
without awareness. Much of the activity is inexpressible, and whilst awareness and
command thinking are signiﬁcant in learning, they often play little part in expert
practice – habitual performance is what is required. Often the body begins to act
before one has mindfully decided to; the illusion is that the mind has made a
choice, but in fact the response is embodied.
Dewey (1896) rejects mental and physical dualism, resolving this in his concept
of experience (Dewey, 1922). The ways people act in social circumstances depend
on their often embodied and unarticulated histories of experience of participation.
These experiences, comprising a physical sense of their own and other participants’
adopted positions, are evoked when similar social circumstances are met and can
render particular behaviours more likely, particularly if these are not reﬂected on.
Thus histories of participation in social activity can lead to dispositions (Dewey,
1925), that is regularities in the ways people apprehend and position themselves
towards the world, which are in part tacit, implicit, embodied and unarticulated. So,
social activity can be consistent, coherent and patterned without the social actors’
awareness of or ability to express the meanings or purposes behind their activity
and so evaluate or analyse these. Social theorists like Bourdieu (1993) refer to such
patterned behaviours as structures. So, a teacher may ﬁnd boys in the classes they
teach more reluctant to answer open questions than girls, and over time develop a
tendency to pose only closed questions to boys. This, in turn, may position these
boys in an uncontested relation to knowledge and can, again over time, dispose
them to see things in straightforward terms. And all of this could happen without
any of the actors’ explicit awareness.
In social interactions participants contribute a complex of individual and shared
histories of embodied engagement. But they also bring ideas, stories and ways of
thinking about the context. These two aspects of experience (Dewey, 1922) are
inseparable; they happen together. Similarly in craft expertise Sennett (2009) posits
an intimate connection between doing and thinking, between the ‘how’ and ‘why’
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of activity; a co-constitution which evolves through the circularity of repetition and
practice into a habituated rhythm between problem-solving and problem-ﬁnding. As
one develops, Sennett asserts, one becomes more problem attuned, and less
mechanical.
Such reiﬁcations and narratives can help script lived experiences. It may be
that some individuals or groups habitually follow scripts, both of talk and activity
(Tomkins, 1987), whilst others are choreographed more loosely. Gergen (1999)
reports how the stories people tell of themselves as ‘always unlucky’ or ‘ready
for the challenge’ inﬂuence their experience of chronic illness; Sfard and Prusak
(2005) discuss the power of narrative identity in constructing the self, and many
studies have explored how teachers’ narrative constructions help them make sense
of or story their working lives (Watson, 2006) and Gergen (1999) describes how
people follow narrative constructions in seeking coherence and causality in their
lives.
Activity is purposive
For Dewey (1922), behaviour cannot be explained as responses to simple external
stimuli. Instead people participate in their environments, interacting with artefacts
and others for a variety of purposes – be it instinctively and impulsively to satisfy
biological needs such as hunger, selectively following interests and preferences such
as when expressing tastes, or seeking approval, status or inﬂuence in meaningful
interactions such as through adherence to customs of etiquette at a dinner party, and
so on.
Purposes (be they communal such as meeting aims, objectives, targets, and so
on, or more individual such as satisfying needs, wants, desires, and so on) inﬂuence
the way systems, organisations and people do things. The more particular ends are
valued or privileged by individuals or communities and thus invested with higher
status, or the more particular outcomes are desired by individuals, the greater their
inﬂuence. It is clear that explicit and stated expectations can drive social behaviours
– but so can tacit and unstated ones including those we met earlier in habitual and
embodied behaviour, as can shared expectations of what can and cannot be said
and done developed through enculturation, where shared histories of practice dis-
pose individuals to adopt group norms. Here, pressure to conform may be largely
embodied in feelings of comfort or discomfort, accepting that there is a natural state
of things which is not subject to challenge.
Dewey (1922) recognises people’s motivation for acting can be internal (such as
anticipating satisfaction based on past experience) or external (such as social pres-
sure to conform), but by having social origins is more likely a combination of both
(such as social pressure to conform whilst imagining discomfort if one fails to do
so); and that both the purpose of activity and the activity itself are in constant
dynamic iteration, constructing and reconstructing each other. Sennett’s (2009)
views of craft expertise illustrate this complexity. Craft experts, he suggests, are
dedicated to good work for its own sake and fully engaged in that work. Their
focus is entirely on the quality of their work which they aspire to improve, to ‘get
better and not just get by’ (Sennett, 2009, p. 24), but this also leads to personal sat-
isfaction, self-respect and the respect of colleagues, clients and the wider commu-
nity. However, this brings a tension between the desire for satisfaction and respect
which provokes perfectionism, and the goals of effective and efﬁcient working.
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Thus, acts are functional (that is, deﬁned by their purpose and the work they
do) and embedded (in context, in systems of meaning, in relation to previous expe-
rience, and so on) (Dewey, 1922). Dewey (Dewey & Tufts, 1936) acknowledges
acts may have many purposes or ends, and these might be incompatible, in conﬂict
and subject to ongoing negotiation. This is particularly the case with public services
such as schooling which are tasked to achieve many outcomes. These can be com-
plementary, sitting within the same set of assumptions and achievable through simi-
lar practices, or they can be achievable only through contradictory practices.
Separate organisations and individual practitioners themselves may bring their own
view on their purpose which may similarly be complementary or contradictory.
There are many possibilities for people to adopt contradictory positions in com-
plex social practice. Teachers may adopt one teaching approach for a ‘core subject’
in which high stakes are attached to student exam performance, but a very different
approach to teaching a ‘non-examination’ subject without recognising any contradic-
tion. They may treat different groups of students differently for no apparent reason.
And, of course, as has already been mentioned, they may say that they do one thing
whilst actually doing something very different.
Kelly (2006) describes how instrumental working practices in schools position
teachers as manual implementers of policy and so can assign to them identities as
technicians. Sometimes, the purposes assigned to individuals though social pres-
sures to conform may not actually suit their best interests. They may meet the needs
of groups other than themselves. An example of this might be someone’s willing-
ness to accept or even defend discriminatory practices against themselves in a soci-
ety where such practices are socially acceptable or expected, because they
anticipate the discomfort brought by their resistance, or even uncritically accept
their marginalisation as the natural order of things. But whilst they are discriminated
against, another group (in whose interests things are organised) beneﬁts from privi-
leged treatment.
A signiﬁcant concern here is that when particular purposes are privileged, others
are sidelined. For example, in schooling it has long been understood that successful
pupils understand the assessment systems within the classroom, and put their ener-
gies into meeting these rather than spending too much time on things which are not
assessed and therefore not rewarded (Doyle, 1983, 1986). This has led to educa-
tional researchers like Doyle to conclude that where assessment leads, the curricu-
lum follows – in many cases narrowing the curriculum to only that which is
assessed. So if teachers adopt approaches to assessment which only test a narrow
range of approaches to, say, calculation in mathematics, this might lead other areas
of mathematics to be ignored, or students to see little value in them.
People adapt their actions in pursuit of goals
Dewey (1896) asserts that explanations of complex human experience cannot be
assembled from simple and separate parts. Rather he sees humans’ behaviour as
continuously adaptive towards better functioning in their environment, function
being deﬁned by their purpose and the work do they do. Thus, he suggests it is in
the nature of organisms that they interact continuously with their environments in a
manner that is cumulative and mutually modifying (Dewey, 1897, 1922, 1925).
People adapt their behaviours either individually or socially to achieve shared
goals, and as already mentioned, the more signiﬁcant the objective, the greater its
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inﬂuence. This adaptation is often unplanned and may be unpredictable; embodied
activity which best leads to the achievement of particular signiﬁcant objectives sur-
vives, whilst that which doesn’t dies out, and these actions are remembered and
brought to bear on subsequent occasions. This increase in participants’ competence
can happen without participants’ attention to it. So, from an earlier example, in
becoming more expert as a teacher, one might develop the capability to control a
class without being able to articulate the strategies one is using to do this.
Although such goals need not be explicit nor actions deliberate for this to hap-
pen, often with explicit goals this adaptive process can be accelerated by deliberate
activity. An example of this is sports coaching. The coach focuses on the particular
physical skills which make up expert performance. They provide activities which
focus on aspects of expert performance, and give immediate feedback to, say, ath-
letes during or immediately after their performance. The aim throughout is improv-
ing competitive sporting outcomes. Through this process athletes, swimmers and
the like improve much more quickly than they would do through adaptive trial and
error.
So, stated simply, people’s participation in complex social practice is largely
unconsidered, embodied, embedded and functional.
Implications for practice
A Deweyan perspective challenges the dualism of Schön (1983, 1987), for whom
reﬂection links knowledge to practice and that of socio-culturalists like Billett
(2001), who replaces Schön’s noun knowledge with the verb knowing. Rather,
Dewey presents activity as often routine and unconsidered, in keeping with socially
shared or habitually adopted norms and expectations, and built on previous embod-
ied and socially embedded experiences. Such behaviour is patterned or structured.
But people can also deliberately pursue explicit goals. In this we should note that
being unconsidered is not the same as being unaware of activity. Indeed, the dis-
tinction between being aware and unaware is ﬂuid, as things attended to come in
and out of focus. This relationship is elaborated by Sennett (2009). Craft experts
are dedicated to good work for its own sake, fully engaged in that work and always
aspiring to improve. They enjoy much personal satisfaction and the respect of oth-
ers. Their skills are embodied, socially embedded and distributed. Although trained
through constant repetition, their skills evolve ﬂexibly and are not directed towards
a ﬁxed end. And in craft expertise there is an intimate connection between doing
and thinking, the physical and mental, and the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of activity, which
evolves through the circularity of repetition and practice into habit, and which
involves a rhythm between problem-solving and problem-ﬁnding.
This perspective problematises reﬂection in social activity. As people become
more expert, attending to some of the things normally done habitually can impair
performance. For example, experienced teachers often report making uncharacteris-
tic errors when observed by a senior manager or inspector. Here expert performance
is most efﬁcient when it is largely unconsidered and embodied. Visceral knowledge
of how to act routinely is what Ball (2003) calls practical sense and Bourdieu
describes as ‘strategies devoid of strategic design’ (1990, p. 108). It may well
encompass the best ways of achieving particular goals in particular social circum-
stances. Indeed, Sennett suggests repetition and practice help convert ideas and
embodiments into the instinctive, tacit knowledge accompanied by awareness and
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rationalisation in craft expertise. For Sennett we mustn’t simply privilege rational
knowledge.
Whilst some aspects of expertise are routine, not all are so, and Sennett asserts
craft experts often work in a space between problem-solving and problem-ﬁnding
with new problems emerging from the solution of earlier ones. Teachers facing
non-routine problems may need to act in a considered and reﬂective manner. But
the focus of such considerations may simply be to reconﬁgure problems so that they
can be addressed using routine principles, stories or actions in their solution and so
close the process of problem ﬁnding; reﬂection on critical incidents of non-routine
problem-solving could be important in identifying and interrogating this. In this
regard the keeping of professional journals to record such processes is important
because these can later be reﬂexively interrogated to uncover and challenge precon-
ceptions and assumptions.
But notions of craft expertise as largely practical are limiting. This is not the
perspective presented here, which calls on teachers to hold their professional actions
to account by deliberately seeking problems through reﬂection. They may look for
patterns or contradictions in practice, ascertaining whom these privilege and whom
they do not, and deliberately changing practice accordingly. For example, a group
of teachers working in a school serving a socio-economically disadvantaged area
tend towards using problem-solving approaches linked strongly to real-life contexts,
because these engage most students in their work and promote learning. Over time
such approaches become central to school culture, and their effectiveness is
accepted unquestioningly. Through enculturation the work of new teachers also
becomes patterned thus. But despite their success, such approaches fail to help stu-
dents understand the principles of abstraction, and so they are disadvantaged by an
excess of such teaching when much academic attainment depends on the ability to
deal with the abstract. In such cases teachers are called on to use the sociological
imagination (Wright Mills, 1959) to ‘make visible what is rendered invisible
through the society’s institutional procedures, and through the daily practices of its
members’ (Bernstein, 1975, p. 157), and to interrogate patterned behaviours or
structures (Bourdieu, 1993) and their associated goals in practice. Bourdieu (1992,
1993) sees reﬂexivity as central to the capacity of individuals to recognise forces of
socialiszation and act agentively.
How might they do this? Sennett suggests craft experts seek problems, and are
curious about, investigate and learn from ambiguity. In the example above, teachers
might look for students advantaged in important areas of assessment, and then seek
ways to support those less advantaged in ways which best suit their needs. But, in
seeking problems like this, explorations should necessarily draw on a variety of
people, perspectives and data to provide a diversity of viewpoints, considering these
through different explanatory frames and social theories. Critical practitioner
research approaches can give conﬁdence to evaluations of practice – in this exam-
ple, perhaps the evaluation of approaches for teaching about abstraction with socio-
economically disadvantaged students. Thus, a consideration of ways to promote
practitioner research approaches is important, and certainly institutional cultures are
signiﬁcant. In this Sennett suggests craft expertise in a community is often best
when it is collaborative, when communication is completely open, and when there
are shared goals and practices.
Nevertheless, a Deweyan perspective does suggest the importance of attending
to both the rational dimensions of experience and the affective. So, whilst some
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teachers might rationalise a dilemma into contradictory positions, others might sense
dissatisfaction and frustration; and whilst some might make a rational choice, others
might intuit a course of appropriate action. In each case one should be sensitive to
all aspects of experience whilst also seeking to make visible the tacit or affective so
these can be interrogated. But it is important to remember that when embodiments
are put in words they are changed; words can never fully capture the tacit and
implicit, and the more one reﬂects on embodied practice the further one moves
away from it. In this regard it should be noted that immediate descriptions of lived
experience based on actual events have a different status to reﬂective accounts, the
former being much closer to actual practice. Nevertheless, all constructive, mean-
ing-making activity, whether descriptive or more reﬂective, is structured, and so
again it is important that a reﬂexive stance is adopted. No doubt the construction of
representations of practice is limited if conﬁned solely to traditional scholarly
approaches; other forms of representation (such as stories, poetry, dance, drama and
ﬁlm) might also illuminate the visceral in social practice (Leitch, 2006).
So, the Deweyan stance outlined in this article suggests teachers, through their
patterned behaviours, can unwittingly contribute to such macro-sociological structur-
ing as the reproduction of socio-economic inequalities through schooling (Bernstein,
1975). For some, the suggestions I provide for what teachers might do about this
will seem unremarkable: focusing on critical incident analysis of non-routine prac-
tice; using critical practitioner research, analysed from multiple perspectives, to
deliberately problematise and redress the way school work advantages some but not
all students; promoting reﬂexivity in journal keeping and other ways of representing
practice beyond traditional scholarly approaches; and developing collaborative criti-
cal working cultures. But these suggestions are made within a complex and nuanced
frame for understanding teaching, a frame which should alert us to the difﬁculty of
tackling the issues raised. Each suggestion is made to help illuminate habitual,
unconsidered, patterned activity; not something to be taken lightly. Their signiﬁ-
cance can only be fully appreciated when both the importance and challenge of
interrogating practice is recognised as a central to the craft expertise of teaching.
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